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RESOURCES:
Farmers' Rights and Protection of Traditional
Agricultural Knowledge/ Protecting Traditional Agricultural
Knowledge
Brush, Stephen B. (2005 A): Farmers' Rights
and Protection of Traditional Agricultural Knowledge CGIAR System
wide Program on Collective Action and Property Rights Working Paper No. 36
(Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute)
Brush,
Stephen B. (2005 B) Protecting Traditional Agricultural
Knowledge Washington University Journal of Law and Policy, Vol.
17, p. 59-109 |
Summary
In these two contributions,
Stephen B. Brush questions the value of bioprospecting contracts that involve
direct payment and royalties for the purpose of protecting traditional
agricultural knowledge. He argues instead for a common pool approach to the
management of crop genetic resources and as a basis for farmers' rights. Brush
starts out with an analysis of the nature of the 'common heritage' regime that
was a prevalent feature of the management of crop genetic resources until the
adoption of the CBD. In this context he explains key characteristics of
traditional agricultural knowledge and the background to the closing of the
genetic commons by the upcoming intellectual property rights regimes under the
World Trade Organization and by the access and benefit sharing regime under the
CBD. He offers examples of domestic implementation of these regimes from
Colombia, Mexico and Costa Rica, all showing the negative effects of such
regimes for the management of crop genetic resources.
An important
reason for these problems is that the access and benefit sharing regimes
derived from the CBD failed to distinguish between wild and domesticated plant
genetic resources. According to Brush, there are three important differences
(pp. 21[A]/80[B]): '(1) involvement of numerous farmers and farming communities
in creating and maintaining genetic resources, (2) genetic complexity of crop
traits, and (3) a long history of exchange and publicly supported conservation
of crop genes within and outside of their places of origin.' Crop genetic
resources should be approached in a fundamentally different way, reviving the
'common heritage' approach.
On this background, Brush analyses the
International Treaty. He concludes that the 'common heritage' principle has
re-emerged in the Treaty, with its Multilateral System of Access and Benefit
Sharing. This is the context in which the provisions of the International
Treaty on farmers' rights are explored. Bioprospecting contracts between
farming communities and seed companies would not only be legally difficult, but
could also lead to market failure because a multitude of farmers would face an
extremely limited set of potential 'buyers' of their genetic resources. For
this and other reasons, alternative approaches to the realization of farmers'
rights need to be found. Brush suggests four guidelines for the crafting of
national policies (pp. 29[A]/93[B]): (1) the goals of farmers' rights should
balance breeders' rights and encourage farmers to continue as stewards and
providers of crop genetic resources; (2) farmers' rights should be viewed as
collective rights rather than rights of individual farmers or communities; (3)
farmers' rights should not be exclusive and are not meant to limit access to
genetic resources; and (4) mechanisms are needed for sharing the benefits
received by the international community from the genetic material from farmers'
fields or international collections.
According to Brush, the weakness of
the International Treaty is that it does not give proper emphasis to the
obligations of industrial and developing countries to support the conservation
of crop genetic resources. Therefore, it does not solve Hardin's classic
'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin, Garrett (1968): 'The Tragedy of the Commons',
Science, 162, pp. 1243-1248) that has beset the management of crop genetic
resources, allowing breeders to benefit from the access to genetic resources
without bearing the costs of maintaining them. Instead, development assistance
is the most likely source of funds for realizing farmers' rights under the
current regime. The irony of this conclusion is that 'it reverts to tools and
principles that were established before the assault on common heritage', Brush
concludes (pp. 34[A]/109[B]). |
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